FastFlux-Malware leading to FakeAV (Update)

malware_warningOur researchers found a malicious JavaScript link embedded to the headlines and thread titles in some forums as well as on other web sites after a user notified us about possible issues with a particular forum. The scripts resulted in slowing down forum access which raised suspicion, so we started to analyse what was going on.

In those forums there were links embedded in the posts which lead to a JavaScript on a Russian website. A google search with the URL revealed that already more than 100 web pages, especially forums, got infected with that malicious link – the infection rate is increasing fast. Later another URL with the malware script was identified, which Google reported on more than 16.000 obviously infected web pages.

Fig. 1: The JavaScript is encrypted and obfuscated in several layers.

Fig. 1: The JavaScript is encrypted and obfuscated in several layers.

The JavaScript is trying to exploit several vulnerabilities to silently install malware on affected users’ computers. Among these are exploits for Microsoft Video ActiveX Control Vulnerability (CVE-2008-0015), Microsoft Internet Explorer XML Parsing Vulnerability (CVE-2008-4844), Microsoft Internet Explorer Malformed CSS Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2009-0076) and some PDF exploits for Firefox and the Internet Explorer. All these exploits are already known and security updates are available. The malware writers obviously assume that a lot of Internet users do not update their systems.

Fig. 2: Decrypting the JavaScript needed some brute force, too.

Fig. 2: Decrypting the JavaScript needed some brute force, too.

That malicious JavaScript is hosted on a fast-flux’ed domain – the Internet addresses to which the embedded link points resolves to different locations every few minutes (fast flux as abbreviation from fast fluctuation, see Wikipedia). So it doesn’t help to take down one server as there are plenty of them. Usually infected computers serve the malware.

Fig. 2: The domain the JavaScript was loaded from was a fastflux'ed domain.

Fig. 3: The domain the JavaScript was loaded from was a fastflux'ed domain.

The servers are GeoIP-aware. Trying to access them directly with an IP from Deutsche Telekom network resulted in an “access denied”, while using a proxy in the USA made the bots deliver the malware.

Fig. 3: The shellcode in the JavaScript finally leads to a FakeAV infection.

Fig. 4: The shellcode in the JavaScript finally leads to a FakeAV infection.

But this malware – Avira detects it TR/FraudPack.ams – is just another downloader. It is encrypted with some layers as well.

Fig. 5: The crypter author sends out greetings to Sunbelt.

Fig. 5: The crypter author sends out greetings to Sunbelt.

One of the encryption layers contains greetings to the company Sunbelt.

Fig. 4: Contents of the FakeAV downloader svcst.exe.

Fig. 6: Contents of the FakeAV downloader svcst.exe.

It accesses a set of “double fast-flux’ed” domains to fetch the actual malware, a FakeAV and a ftp password stealer which sends the data to guest books on the Internet. These are detected by Avira with generic detection as TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen and as TR/FakeAV.RK, while the password uploader gets detected as TR/Downloader.Gen.

Fig. 5: The FakeAV disguises itself as Antivirus Pro 2010.

Fig. 7: The FakeAV disguises itself as Antivirus Pro 2010.

The WebGuard of the Avira Premium and Professional blocks the URLs from where the malicious JavaScript is included and also the malware download URLs. Avira AntiVir also protects users from the downloaded malware.

(Article updated on 6th October to add more details about the malware.)

Emanuel Somosan
Moritz Kroll
Engine R&D

Dirk Knop
Technical Editor